Towards an empirical test of realism in cognition by Yearsley, J. & Pothos, E. M.
Yearsley, J. & Pothos, E. M. (2015). Towards an empirical test of realism in cognition. Lecture 
Notes in Computer Science, 8951, pp. 271-282. doi: 10.1007/978-3-319-15931-7_21 
City Research Online
Original citation: Yearsley, J. & Pothos, E. M. (2015). Towards an empirical test of realism in 
cognition. Lecture Notes in Computer Science, 8951, pp. 271-282. doi: 10.1007/978-3-319-15931-
7_21 
Permanent City Research Online URL: http://openaccess.city.ac.uk/7152/
 
Copyright & reuse
City University London has developed City Research Online so that its users may access the 
research outputs of City University London's staff. Copyright © and Moral Rights for this paper are 
retained by the individual author(s) and/ or other copyright holders.  All material in City Research 
Online is checked for eligibility for copyright before being made available in the live archive. URLs 
from City Research Online may be freely distributed and linked to from other web pages. 
Versions of research
The version in City Research Online may differ from the final published version. Users are advised 
to check the Permanent City Research Online URL above for the status of the paper.
Enquiries
If you have any enquiries about any aspect of City Research Online, or if you wish to make contact 
with the author(s) of this paper, please email the team at publications@city.ac.uk.
Towards an Empirical Test of Realism
in Cognition
James M. Yearsley(B) and Emmanuel M. Pothos
Department of Psychology, City University London, London EC1V 0HB, UK
james.yearsley.1@city.ac.uk
Abstract. We review recent progress in designing an empirical test of
(temporal) realism in cognition. Realism in this context is the property
that cognitive variables always have well defined (if possibly unknown)
values at all times. We focus most of our attention in this contribution
on discussing the exact notion of realism that is to be tested, as we
feel this issue has not received enough attention to date. We also give
a brief outline of the empirical test, including some comments on an
experimental realisation, and we discuss what we should conclude from
any purported experimental ‘disproof’ of realism. This contribution is
based on Yearsley and Pothos (2014).
1 Introduction
Our aim in this contribution is to give an overview of recent work that seeks
to address the question of whether models of cognitive processes can be (tem-
porally) realist. We will define exactly what we mean by realist below, but the
key finding is that given a suitable definition this question can be empirically
answered by simple experiments. This contribution is based on Yearsley and
Pothos (2014), but instead of simply summarising this paper we will instead
focus on two of the most important issues and discuss them in depth. The two
issues we shall focus our attention on are firstly the exact notion of ‘realism’
which is to be empirically tested, and secondly the possibilities open to us should
experiments rule out this particular notion of realism. We feel these are impor-
tant topics to address because the empirical test we shall propose, which has
been discussed before (Attmanspacher and Filk (2010)), is borrowed from the
physics literature, and it is far from clear how this test is to be derived or inter-
preted in the context of cognitive models. We shall take advantage of the fact
that this contribution is based on an existing paper to skip much of the technical
detail; interested readers are invited to consult Yearsley and Pothos (2014).
The rest of this contribution is structured as follows; in Sect. 2 we discuss the
notion of realism in cognitive models in a general way and in Sects. 2 and 3 we
introduce the two smaller assumptions that together make up the assumption of
realism proper. In Sect. 4 we make some very brief comments on the empirical
test of realism we propose. In Sect. 5 we then discuss the options for cognitive
modelling should our empirical test rule out realism. We conclude in Sect. 6.
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2 Realism in Cognitive Models
Every thought, feeling and memory that we have ultimately arises from, is
processed by or is stored in the physical matter of our brains. Thus, in prin-
ciple, if it were possible to know exactly the physical specification of a subject’s
brain at any moment of time, we should be able to know that subject’s feelings
and predict their judgments. Of course, such a scenario is the stuﬀ of science
fiction rather than current psychology, but the fundamental principle behind it,
that the behaviour of cognitive variables such as feelings and judgments can be
reduced to the physical specification of our neurophysical states does manifest
itself in an important way in current cognitive models. In brief, most current
cognitive models have a property that we might term ‘realism,’ that is, it is an
implicit assumption of these models that all the cognitive variables whose values
are described by a given model have definite values at all times (cf Raijmakers
and Molenaar (2004)).
This assumption arises in a natural way when we consider the link between
cognitive processes at the level of thoughts and feelings, and the underlying
neurophysiology of the brain which is assumed to give rise to these thoughts and
feelings. For the purposes of this contribution we assume the most fundamental
processes in the brain relevant for cognition may be described by classical physics
(the alternative hypothesis, that brain function at the neuro level is non-classical,
is very controversial (beim Graben and Atmanspacher (2009).) It is a key feature
of classical physics that the positions, electric charges, etc. of all classical particles
are definite at all times, that is, whilst the values of these quantities may be
subjectively uncertain (since we have only limited knowledge of them) they are
nevertheless objectively certain. Thus, one might reasonably argue, if cognition
is ultimately determined by brain neurophysiology, and if the most fundamental
variables at the neurophysiological level have definite but unknown values, then
presumably all cognitive variables must also have definite if unknown values. We
will argue that this assumption is in fact highly questionable.
To make the argument more concrete consider a simple example; the first
author of this contribution enjoys crisps, and he also enjoys chocolate. At any
given moment of time he will have a preference for either crisps over choco-
late, or vice versa. Let us denote this cognitive variable by the function C(t),
which may take values between +1 (definitely prefer crisps) and −1 (definitely
prefer chocolate.) If we desire we could measure this variable crudely by asking
the author which snack he would prefer, or we could measure it more precisely
by asking him to make some trade oﬀ between various quantities of crisps and
chocolate. The key assumption of classical models of cognition is that this vari-
able C(t) always has a well defined value between ±1 at all times. This may
seem reasonable over the course of some short lab experiment, but does it really
make sense over longer periods of time? What happens when the author is dis-
tracted by writing a conference contribution? Or what if he has just sated his
appetite with a bag of jelly beans? Does this cognitive variable nevertheless still
exist, tirelessly winding some intricate path between ±1 which only the gods, or
possibly the advertising executives, can trace?
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Towards an Empirical Test of Realism in Cognition 3
The alternative to a realist account of cognitive variables is one wherein
such variables do not possess values until they are measured, that is, measuring
such variables is a constructive process. The idea that measuring the value of
a cognitive variable can change that value has been considered before, and can
be easily incorporated within classical models of cognition. However what we
are suggesting here is slightly diﬀerent, it is not a question of measurements
changing the values of existing quantities, rather the process of measurement
creates those values, where previously there were none. This idea may sound
familiar to anyone who has come across quantum theory before (see e.g. Jammer
(1966)), and we will have more to say on this connection below. For now note
that in the example we gave above it is not so hard to imagine that the author’s
preference for crisps over chocolate simply isn’t defined at time when he is not,
consciously or unconsciously, thinking about eating.
Why should we care whether our cognitive theories are realist or not? Well
there are two main reasons; the first is that there are certain types of behaviour
that are possible in non-realist models that are impossible in realist ones. This
means that there may be limits on the type of cognitive processes realist theories
are able to describe. The second reason seems to the authors more important;
the ultimate aim of constructing cognitive models is not simply to describe or
even predict cognitive processes, but at some level to understand them. For this
reason it is important to have some confidence that the structural features of
our models match or map in some sense the way cognition happens in the brain.
Although our understanding of the physiology of cognition is currently far too
limited to be used to impose detailed constraints on cognitive models, there are
nevertheless some basic constraints that we can impose that do limit the classes
of cognitive models we should consider acceptable. One of these concerns the idea
of ‘bounded cognition’; we would argue a second one concerns realism (for some
work in this direction see Jones and Love (2011).)
So how are we to tell whether cognition is realist or not? We hinted at
the answer earlier; there are some types of behaviour that are impossible to
reproduce within a realist cognitive model. Our task therefore is to produce
a test which will allow us to determine whether a given set of judgments can
be described by a realist cognitive model, and to suggest some possible cognitive
variables which may fail this test. We will do this below, but first we need to be
clearer on exactly what we mean by realism in cognitive models.
In the next two sections we will discus two reasonable assumptions which
together we claim form the assumption of ‘realism’ in cognitive models. We
will spend some time discussing these assumptions in depth, because they are
really the most important part of this work. Obviously since our test of ‘real-
ism’ is really a joint test of these assumptions its significance depends entirely
on whether one believes these assumptions really capture the correct notion of
realism in cognition. But as well as this because there are two separate assump-
tions any purported failure of ‘realism’ leaves us the option of retaining one
of the assumptions, and if we want to be clear about which one (if either) we
should retain we need first be clear on their meaning. Once we have done this our
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4 J.M. Yearsley and E.M. Pothos
empirical test of realism follows by some elementary algebra, which we shall skip,
and the task of choosing a likely cognitive variable is an exercise in experimental
cunning rather than intellectual vigour.
3 Realism Part 1: Cognitive Realism
Let us set out our first assumption which, together with the assumption discussed
in the next section, together define ‘realism’ in cognitive models.
Cognitive Realism: This is the assumption that the reason for any judgement
at the cognitive level is ultimately (in principle, if not in practice) reducible to
processes at the neurophysiological level.
This assumption is perhaps what one might think of if one is asked to char-
acterise realism. In fact it might seem like no further assumptions are needed,
we will explain why this is not the case below. For now let us instead introduce
some notation to help us make this assumption more precise, and to put it on the
required mathematical footing needed for our empirical test. Consider again our
example cognitive variable C(t). Let us denote the complete neurophysiological
state of a given subject as λ. Cognitive Realism means that there is a function
which, given that the neurophysiological state of the subject is initially λ, will
tell us the value of C(t), let us denote this by C(λ, t). This is what we meant
in the introduction when we said that realism means that, in principle, were we
to know the physical state of a subject’s brain we would know all their feelings
and be able to predict their judgments. However in practice of course we can-
not know a subject’s exact neurophysiological state, the best we can do is give
some probability distribution based on the limited knowledge we do have. Let
us denote the probability distribution representing our knowledge of a subject’s
λ as ρ(λ). Then our best guess about the value of C(t) given our knowledge of
the neurophysiological state is,
〈C(t)〉 =
∑
λ
C(λ, t)ρ(λ), (1)
that is, the expected value of C(t) is just the expectation value of C(λ, t), given
the probability distribution ρ(λ).
Let us make few comments about this assumption, and its mathematical
consequence Eq. (1).
– The observant reader may find the time dependence in Eq. (1) rather odd, in
that is contained in the cognitive variable rather than in the distribution over
neurophysiological states. This is purely notational, the current notation fits
present purposes better.
– Let us stress that there is no expectation that we know the subject’s λ, and
also no requirement that we know the function C(λ, t). Even if Cognitive
Realism is true a subject’s λ need not be knowable even in principle, but the
λ’s should be well defined and C(λ, t) must exist.
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Towards an Empirical Test of Realism in Cognition 5
– The assumption of cognitive realism may also be expressed in the following
important way: for any set of judgements, and at all times, a subject has a
definite opinion about all judgements.
– It is very diﬃcult to see how this assumption could fail to be valid at some
level. After all, if the values of cognitive variables are not determined by the
brain, what are they determined by?
– The previous point notwithstanding, for the derivation of our empirical test
to hold the λ need only be some variables which by assumption always have
well defined values, it is not strictly necessary that they be neurophysiological.
For more on this point see Yearsley and Pothos (2014).
Cognitive Realism may seem to totally capture the notion of realism we had
in mind in the introduction. However there are two important missing ingredi-
ents in the discussion in this section. The first is a description of how measure-
ment of a cognitive variable works. This may seem somewhat pedantic, but it
is important to establish whether one can carry out reliable measurements of
these variables, and to see how this fits in with realism. The second ingredient is
some kind of assurance that we can take finite collections of cognitive variables
and embed them into a cognitive model in a self-consistent way. In other words,
Cognitive Realism is the assumption that the cognitive level can be connected
to the neurophysiological level; what we also need is an assumption that the cog-
nitive level can be disconnected from the neurophysiological level, and modelled
on its own. That is the content of our second assumption.
4 Realism Part 2: Cognitive Completeness
Our second assumption is harder to state than our first. It concerns the cognitive
state of subjects. This is defined to be the object that captures all the information
needed to make predictions about a subject’s judgments in the context of a
particular cognitive model. It is therefore equivalent to an exhaustive set of
probabilities for future measurement outcomes1. The exact form the cognitive
state takes will depend on the model, and we want to state our assumption
without reference to any particular form.
Cognitive Completeness: This is the assumption that the cognitive state of
a person responding to such a set of judgements can be entirely determined by
the probabilities for the judgement outcomes.
That is, observing participant behaviour can fully determine the underlying
cognitive state, without the need to invoke neurophysiological variables. The
reason this assumption is more vague than the first is that we have not defined
exactly what the cognitive state is supposed to be. Generally this will depend
on the model and we cannot assume, for example, that the cognitive state is a
probability distribution over thoughts or judgments. However whatever the form
1 The idea of defining the state of a system in this way occurs frequently in physics,
see e.g. Hardy (2001).
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6 J.M. Yearsley and E.M. Pothos
of the cognitive state, if this is the object that allows us to predict judgment
outcomes then it is important that it can be determined entirely in terms of
them, otherwise it is not possible to establish this state empirically, making
prediction impossible.
This assumption has an important consequence. Consider any measurement
made on a group of participants that does not change the probabilities for
the outcomes of any future judgement in the relevant cognitive model. Let us
call such measurements non-disturbing. Whether or not a measurement is non-
disturbing can be established empirically.
Cognitive completeness means that, as long as a measurement is non-
disturbing, it can be assumed to have no eﬀect on the neurophysiological state of
a participant. This is because cognitive completeness tells us that the cognitive
state of the participants may be fully determined by knowledge of the outcomes
of all judgements in the relevant cognitive model. Thus, at most, a non-disturbing
measurement may change the underlying neurophysiological state in a way that
gives rise to the same cognitive state. However, any such change is undetectable
by any measurement relevant to the cognitive model, and thus we can simply
assume that no change in the neurophysiological state occurred.
It is useful to express this in a more mathematical way. Cognitive Complete-
ness means that every cognitive model defines a set of similarity classes on the
set of all probability distributions over the neuropsychological variables, with
two distributions ρ(λ) and ρ′(λ) being similar, ρ(λ) ∼ ρ′(λ), if they lead to the
same predictions for all judgements contained in the cognitive model. In general
measurement of the cognitive variable C(t1) at t1 will change the distribution
of neurophysiological variables so that a subsequent measurement of, e.g. C(t2)
with t2 > t1, will depend on whether or not the first measurement was made.
Denote the new distribution over the λ after measurement at t1 as ρ(λ; t1). Then
joint measurement of C(t1) and C(t2) yields,
〈C(t1)C(t2)〉 =
∑
λ
C(λ, t1)C(λ, t2)ρ(λ; t1) (2)
However if the measurement at t1 was non-disturbing this is equal to
〈C(t1)C(t2)〉 =
∑
λ
C(λ, t1)C(λ, t2)ρ(λ). (3)
This is the mathematical result used in the derivation of our empirical test.
As a mathematical aside, we now sketch how Cognitive Realism and Cogni-
tive Completeness may be used to derive the existence of a probability distrib-
ution over the cognitive variables2. We will assume that we are measuring the
value of a cognitive variable C(t) which may take a finite number of possible
2 The existence of such a probability distribution in fact follows directly if our empir-
ical test is satisfied, this is the cognitive analogue of Fine’s theorem (Fine (1982),
Halliwell (in press)). For a further discussion of the conditions under which such
probability distributions may be defined, see Bruza et al. (2013).
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Towards an Empirical Test of Realism in Cognition 7
values, which we will denote {ci}3. We begin with the generalisation of Eq. (2)
for a series of measurements of C(t) at a number of times,
〈C(t1)C(t2)...C(tn)〉 =
∑
λ
C(λ, t1)C(λ, t2)...C(λ, tn)ρ(λ; t1, t2, ...tn) (4)
For each measurement the set of possible λ may be split into subsets Λi(t)
according to the value of C(λ, t). Denote the function which is 1 if λ ∈ Λi(t)
and 0 otherwise by χi(λ, t) This can be done for every measurement, so we can
write,
〈C(t1)C(t2)...C(tn)〉 =
∑
λ
∑
i
ciχi(λ, t1)
∑
j
cjχj(λ, t2)...
∑
k
ckχ(λ, tn)ρ(λ; t1, t2, ...tn)
=
∑
i,j...k
ci, cj ...ckP (i, t1; j, t2; ...k, t3), (5)
where
P (i, t1; j, t2; ...k, t3) =
∑
λ
χi(λ, t1)χj(λ, t2)...χ(λ, tn)ρ(λ; t1, t2, ...tn). (6)
Because P (i, t1; j, t2; ...k, tn) is just a coarse-graining of the original ρ(λ; t1, t2...tn)
it is guaranteed to be a probability distribution on the set of measurement out-
comes. However because ρ(λ; t1, t2...tn) depends on whether or not the measure-
ments are performed this probability does not obey the correct sum rules when
one or more measurements are summed out. However if we use the assumption of
Cognitive Completeness we can drop the dependence of ρ on the measurements
provided they are non-disturbing, in which case P (i, t1, j, t2...k, tn) becomes inde-
pendent of whether the measurements are performed or not and therefore obeys
the correct sum rules. This is the way in which Cognitive Realism and Cognitive
Completeness imply the existence of a probability distribution over the cognitive
variables.
5 Interlude: The Empirical Test and Some
Experimental Considerations
Now that we have our two assumptions we can discuss the empirical test of
realism that is the main achievement of this work. The test takes the form of
a set of inequalities satisfied by realist systems but which may be violated by
general systems. These inequalities may be easily derived from the mathematical
expressions of Cognitive Realism and Cognitive Completeness, however rather
than take up space in this contribution repeating algebra, we instead refer the
interested reader to the appendix of Yearsley and Pothos (2014). We shall simply
3 The extension to a cognitive variable with a continuous range of values is simple,
but unenlightening.
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8 J.M. Yearsley and E.M. Pothos
quote the result, again in terms of our example variable C(t) which recall takes
values ±1.
|〈C(t1)C(t2)〉+ 〈C(t2)C(t3)〉+ 〈C(t3)C(t4)〉 − 〈C(t1)C(t4)〉| ≤ 2 (7)
Equation (7) is one of a collection of inequalities known as the temporal Bell4,
or Leggett-Garg inequalities, first derived as constraints on physical systems by
Leggett and Garg (1985). Their significance in physics is much debated (see e.g.
Ballentine (1987), Palacios-Laloy et al. (2010), Wilde (2012), George et al. (2013)
and Yearsley (2013), and references therein), but note that the assumptions lead-
ing to their derivation in cognition are relatively uncontroversial. We will have
nothing further to say about the use of these inequalities outside of cognition.AQ1
What would a concrete experimental set up to test these inequalities look
like? Well we need four ingredients; the first is a cognitive variable which we
are sure has two distinct values. There are many possible examples. The second
is some way to manipulate the expected value of that variable, this could be
through presentation of stimuli over which the experimenter does not have direct
control, but which happen at regular time intervals, or it could be through
presentation of stimuli over which the experimenter has direct control, in which
case the frequency and order of presentation of the stimuli is not fixed in time,
and the ‘t’ variable in Eq. (7) is better thought of as a parameter rather than as
a physical time. Again it is not hard to think of good examples.
The third ingredient is a reliably non-disturbing measurement process, in the
sense outlined above. This might be hard to invent in general, but it is easy to
establish whether a given measurement process is non-disturbing, so it presents
no problem in principle. We mention in passing that it is not necessary that
the measurement process be completely non-disturbing, being able to bound the
disturbance to some low level is suﬃcient (Yearsley and Pothos (in preparation)).
What might make a good non-disturbing measurement? In physics attention
has focussed on so-called ‘ideal negative measurements.’ The idea is roughly
that a particle which is not detected should not be disturbed by the detector
(Leggett and Garg, 1985). One can therefore use an ideal negative measurement
of whether a particle is in, say, x < 0 to establish that the particle is definitely in
x > 0, but without causing any disturbance. It is not immediately clear whether
these ideas can be translated to psychology.
However there may be another possibility available in psychology which is not
available in physics. In psychology the extent to which a given judgment causes
a change in the knowledge state of the subject can be influenced by details of
the experimental design (e.g. White et al. (2014)). The psychological idea behind
non-disturbing measurements would be to avoid a subject feeling as though they
had made a strong commitment to a particular choice, and it is possible that this
4 This term comes from the fact they these inequalities have a similar form to the
standard Bell inequalities (see e.g. Bell (2004), for their significance in psychology
see Conte et al. (2008) and Aerts et al. (2000). However beyond structural similarity
the two sets of inequalities have little in common, and this terminology can sometimes
lead to more confusion than clarity.
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Towards an Empirical Test of Realism in Cognition 9
could be achieved through a suﬃciently clever experimental design. Note that
the question of whether or not this is possible is deeply connected to the issue
of whether cognition is really ‘quantum’ (or possibly ‘quantum-like’), so that
fundamental limits such as the uncertainty principle always hold, or whether
cognition merely has ‘quantum features’, in which case it may sometimes be
possible to break what in physics are fundamental quantum limits.
What of the final ingredient? Well this is simply the expectation that the cog-
nitive variable in question does behave in a non-classical way. This is in some
sense the most simple and the most diﬃcult property to establish. It may be
possible to use variables which have previously been shown to behave in non-
classical ways (see e.g. Busemeyer et al. (2011), Pothos and Busemeyer (2009),
Trueblood and Busemeyer (2011), Wang and Busemeyer (2013), Wang et al.
(in press)), otherwise some experiential cunning will be needed to choose an
appropriate set of judgments.
6 What Should We Conclude if ‘Realism’ Fails?
Suppose we find an appropriate experimental set up, conduct a test of realism in
the way outlined above, and find a convincing violation of Eq. (7). What should
we conclude? Assuming one agrees with the arguments which lead to Eq. (7) then
the only conclusion is that one or both of our assumptions, Cognitive Realism
and Cognitive Completeness, must be incorrect. But which one?
If one is committed to realism one might be tempted to drop Cognitive Com-
pleteness. The problem is that it is Cognitive Completeness that ensures that
the cognitive state can be empirically determined, and since the cognitive state
is the object which determines the probabilities for the outcomes of judgments,
Cognitive Completeness ensures that any model has genuine predictive power.
Nevertheless one might argue that this problem can be circumvented. If we
cannot fix the cognitive state in terms of the outcomes of judgments contained
in our cognitive model, can we not simply add more judgments, the probabil-
ities for which would be enough to fix the cognitive state? The answer is that
we cannot. The full argument is given in Yearsley and Pothos (2014), but the
essence is that adding any cognitive variables which can be measured in a non-
disturbing way simply gives an extended cognitive model from which the original
one can be recovered by coarse-graining, but since the original model isn’t realist
the extended one cannot be either. Adding in cognitive variables which cannot
be measured in a non-disturbing way solves this problem, but having cognitive
variables which cannot in principle be measured in a non-disturbing way means
the new model still lacks predictive power. In summary, Cognitive Completeness
is possibly even more central to cognitive modelling than realism.
So if we cannot drop Cognitive Completeness, can we drop Cognitive Real-
ism? The answer is we can, we can model cognition with non-realist theories
like quantum probability theory that include a constructive role for judgment.
Quantum probability theory is often described as quantum theory without the
physics (see e.g. Aerts and Aerts (1995), Atmanspacher et al. (2006)), and is
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10 J.M. Yearsley and E.M. Pothos
potentially applicable in any situation where there is a need to quantify uncer-
tainty (see e.g. beam Graben and Atmanspacher (2009)). Indeed there has been
no small measure of success modelling some aspects of cognition in this way
(e.g. Aerts and Gabora (2005), Busemeyer et al. (2011), Pothos and Busemeyer
(2009), Trueblood and Busemeyer (2011), Wang and Busemeyer (2013), Wang
et al. (in press), Bruza et al. (2009). For an overview see Busemeyer and Bruza
(2011), Pothos and Busemeyer (2013).)
However we need to be cautious. Realism imposes a bound on the right hand
side of Eq. (7) equal to 2, but quantum theory also implies a non-trivial bound
on Eq. (7) of 2
√
2 (Tsirelson (1980)). Since the logical bound is 4 we could well
find that our experimental test of realism rules out not just realist theories
of cognition but also quantum ones! Even if the evidence doesn’t directly rule
out quantum theory there are possibilities for non-realist theories other than
quantum theory. In other words, our test of realism may rule out realist models
of cognition, but it cannot ‘rule in’ quantum models. We need to search elsewhere
for convincing evidence for the correctness of quantum approaches to cognition.
Finally we should mention that a failure of realism in cognition could have
great significance for models of memory. If judgment is a constructive process
then it is easy to imagine that memory retrieval may also be modelled construc-
tively in a similar way (this has been suggested before, e.g. Howe and Courage
(1997)). This could open up exciting new possibilities for modelling memories.
7 Conclusion
In this contribution we discussed some of the key issues involved in recent work
on the question of realism in cognitive models. We have focussed on what we
believe are the key conceptual issues, readers desiring the full technical details
are again invited to consult Yearsley and Pothos (2014).
What can we conclude from this discussion? Well firstly we have argued that
the standard notion of realism in cognition might be well motivated, but it is
open to empirical challenge. The successes of the quantum cognition programme
to date suggest, although do not prove, that realism may have to be abandoned
as an assumption in models of cognition. The proposed empirical test of realism
will hopefully settle the issue. This test is tricky to implement, but should be
possible with the right choice of cognitive variable and measurement.
If our tests do rule out realism, this is not by itself reason to adopt quantum
models of cognition. However such models can give valuable insight into what
non-realist approaches may look like. In particular contextually and constructive
judgments are central parts of quantum theory (Kitto (2008), Busemeyer and
Bruza (2011), White et al. (2014)) and these will also be key features of any
non-realist theory.
We wish to conclude by saying that an experimental realisation of this test is
currently underway (Yearsley and Pothos (in preparation)). We await the results
with considerable interest.
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